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Abstract— Ex-ante impact assessment of agricultural, 
environmental, and rural policies has become an 
integral part of political decision making processes in 
the EU. While there is a large variety of agri-
environmental modelling tools available to analyse likely 
social, economic, and environmental impacts of these 
policies, scientifically well-founded ex-ante policy 
assessment tools capturing the institutional dimension 
are still missing. In this paper, we introduce a 
formalised procedure for modelling – ex-ante – 
institutional aspects for policy implementation: the 
‘Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment’ 
(PICA). PICA has been designed as an explorative, yet 
formalised methodology that enables policy makers to 
identify at an early stage potential institutional 
incompatibilities. After providing a brief overview of 
relevant approaches for policy assessment we elaborate 
on the four distinct steps of PICA and use a core element 
of the EU Nitrate Directive to illustrate its function. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
There is an urgent need for scientifically well-founded 
ex-ante policy assessment from an institutional 
perspective. Ex-ante impact assessments in general 
have become an integral and systematic part of 
political decision making processes [1]. Here, the 
analysis of likely social, economic, and environmental 
impacts is more and more often to be complemented 
by an assessment of the institutional dimension [2]. 
Currently, however, institutional policy analysis 
focuses mainly on ex-post policy impact studies to 
evaluate past policy performance. While there is a vast 
amount of institutional ex-post case studies and 
indicator databanks, institutional economists have not 
yet developed standardised procedures using this 
information for making predictions of the institutional 
feasibility of policies.  
In this paper, we introduce the ‘Procedure for 
Institutional Compatibility Assessment’ (PICA). It has 
recently been developed in the frame of the 
SEAMLESS project [3].
1 In this project, an ambitious 
integrative modelling framework for ex-ante 
assessment of policy impacts on sustainable 
development has been created. This ‘SEAMLESS-
Integrated Framework’ has been designed not only to 
assess the policies’ likely impacts on environmental, 
economic, and social systems, but it also has to 
provide indications on whether a policy under scrutiny 
is feasible from an institutional perspective and, thus, 
can be expected to become effective [4]. In this 
context, PICA has been developed as an explorative 
and flexible, yet formalised methodology to assess the 
compatibility between policy options and various 
institutional contexts.  
Following an overview about prominent 
approaches for policy assessment in Section 2, we 
outline in Section 3 the basic assumptions leading to 
the concept of institutional compatibility and elaborate 
on all four distinct steps of PICA, while in the 
subsequent Section 4 different modes of action of the 
procedure will be illustrated, using particular elements 
of the EU Nitrate Directive as a policy example. In the 
                                                           
1 SEAMLESS integrated project, EU 6
th Framework 
Programme, contract no. 010036-2.   2 
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concluding Section 5, we discuss the importance of 
PICA as an explorative tool within the policy making 
process.  
II. OVERVIEW OF APPROACHES FOR POLICY 
ASSESSMENT 
Policy analysis guides the process of selecting 
appropriate policy options to be put into practice. The 
analysis is commonly subdivided into two categories: 
ex-ante and ex-post analysis. Ex-post policy analysis 
is designed to evaluate past policy performance e.g., in 
terms of effectiveness, transparency, and distributional 
fairness to reach policy objectives and includes a wide 
range of methods. The capability of these approaches, 
however, is limited since they do not provide for 
evaluating the effects of policies prior to their 
implementation.  
In contrast, experiences with ex-ante evaluations 
are still rare [5, 6]. In the early phase of the policy life 
cycle, the ‘Cost of Policy Inaction’ method is often 
used as an ex-ante evaluation tool [7]. Methods that 
support a later phase of the policy life cycle are 
subsumed under the notion of ‘ex-ante impact 
assessment’. In cases where it is possible to quantify 
costs and benefits in monetary terms, a major tool for 
ex-ante impact assessment is the Cost-Benefit 
Analysis (CBA). Due to the methodological 
difficulties, the role of CBA within a political context 
is often that of political argument [8, 9]. Other 
supporting valuation methods, such as Contingent 
Valuation, Travel Cost Method, and Hedonic Pricing 
try to capture the problem of monetising likely policy 
impacts. Another way, yet costly and time consuming, 
to make ex-ante predictions of likely impacts of 
policies is to implement alternative versions of the 
policy in an experimental situation and to compare 
their relative impacts. Still, from an institutional 
perspective, costs and frictions of policy design and 
implementation are not adressed by these methods; not 
the least because they are difficult to estimate and 
quantify ex-ante.  
III. THE PROCEDURE FOR INSTITUTIONAL 
COMPATIBILITY ASSESSMENT (PICA) 
Institutional policy assessment is based on the 
assumption that policies will affect certain areas of 
reality which are already subject to valid and (more or 
less) effective institutions. Thus, an adequate and 
correct understanding of the institutional configuration 
and of the situational logic of the institutional 
environment in which a policy is to be implemented is 
needed as a necessary precondition for assessing 
between intended and unintended consequences of that 
policy [8, 10, 11].  
On the one hand, appropriate institutions increase 
the likelihood of actually achieving the policy 
objectives, i.e., they increase the likelihood of actors’ 
compliance and (intended) change of behaviour. On 
the other hand, appropriate institutions ensure that 
these policy objectives are achieved at reasonable 
costs. Policy instruments that have proven to be very 
cost-effective in one specific institutional context 
might perform rather poorly in another, i.e., they 
might be not effective at all, or they might induce 
higher costs to become effective. In particular if 
agricultural, environmental, and rural policies are 
concerned, suitable governance structures have to 
address the specificities of nature-related transactions 
[12] and the prevailing interdependencies of the 
actors, i.e., the fact that the choice of one actor may 
influence the choices other actors make. This problem 
is often overlooked in conventional economics, which 
assumes that agents are independent [13].  
The Procedure for Institutional Compatibility 
Assessment (PICA) has been conceptualised to reveal 
where - i.e., in which country or region - a policy 
option would be compatible with the existing 
institutional structures, and where an institutional 
misfit that is likely to hamper policy implementation 
can be expected. PICA comprises four distinct 
working steps:  
Step 1: The policy options are clustered according 
to a) type of intervention (regulatory, economic, and 
advisory), b) area of intervention (hierarchy/ 
bureaucracy, market, and self-organised network), and 
c) possibly induced property rights changes. This 
classification allows identifying the generic structure 
of a policy option. The objective of this specification 
of policy types is to provide a suitable, yet formalised   3 
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structure, to identify crucial institutional aspects (CIA) 
that are of particular importance for the policy option 
under scrutiny. It is assumed that the policy type, as 
represented by distinct boxes in Table 1, is decisive 
for the range and kind of CIAs that can be expected to 
be conducive or detrimental to the implementation of 
this policy option. Practically, this typology allows 
limiting the number of CIAs that need to be reviewed 
when evaluating the policy to be implemented. In the 
absence of this filter, all identified CIAs relevant for 
agricultural, environmental, and rural development 
policies would have to be taken into account every 
time a policy option is to be assessed.  
Based on Stone [14] and according to similar 
distinctions made by environmental economicsts, the 
types of intervention, shown in the respective rows in 
Table 1, describe how and by which means the impact 
of a policy shall be reached:  
•  Regulatory or command-and-control instruments 
(compulsory): e.g., laws, regulations, specific 
protection targets, and designations of areas for 
protected habitats or species.  
•  Economic instruments often using financial 
(dis)incentives: e.g., taxes, subsidies, grants or 
loans, and tradable pollution permits. 
•  Advisory/Voluntary instruments: e.g., codes of 
good practice, extension services or other 














The area of intervention points to the governance 
structures a policy is supposed to have an impact on. 
The differentiation used in PICA follows to a large 
extent the widely used categories of governance 
structures (hierarchies, markets, and hybrids) 
suggested by Williamson [15]. However, first, it can 
be assumed that almost every governance structure in 
the real world can indeed be seen as some hybrid form 
between the polar cases market and hierarchy. Second, 
with specifying the third column self-organised 
network, the attention is directed to a specific (hybrid) 
form of governance structures that is of particular 
interest if pursuing agricultural, environmental, and 
rural development policy objectives [13].  
The column property rights change is the third 
dimension to describe a policy type. It accounts for 
changes in private or collective property rights likely 
to be induced by the policy option. It covers an 
important institutional specificity of environmental 
policies. The prevailing private property in land may 
often lead to presumptive entitlements in the policy 
arena [16]. Here, the changes induced by the policy 
options are defined in a narrow sense pointing to 
changes in the property rights of farmers on natural 
resources needed for production, such as the 
prohibition to spread manure on the field during 
winter months, having direct impacts on the individual 
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Step 2: Each policy type is characterised by a 
specific set of CIAs
2.  
Step 3: Indicators help to evaluate the potential of 
respective CIAs to constrain or foster the 
implementation of a policy option. The institutional 
indicators
3 are selected from existing indicator lists, 
perhaps modified, or new indicators are elaborated. 
Further, concrete assumptions on links and 
relationships between a CIA and the respective set of 
indicators are made.  
Step 4: The information provided by the 
institutional indicators is used for a qualitative 
assessment of each identified CIA. Subsequently, the 
CIA and the related assessments are arranged in 
thematic categories of institutional compatibility 
leading to qualitative statements about the probable 
effectiveness of a policy option. This allows for 
drawing conclusions about an institutional fit or misfit 
between policy options and institutional contexts.  
IV. INSTITUTIONAL COMPATIBILITY OF THE EU 
NITRATE DIRECTIVE 
The EU Nitrate Directive [17] adopted in 1991 can 
be seen as a prominent and typical example of an EU 
environmental policy addressing water pollution. We 
take one of the core elements of this Directive as an 
example to illustrate PICA: when implementing the 
Directive Member States have to design action 
programmes in vulnerable zones designated before 
that shall consist of mandatory rules. These rules 
determine, e.g., periods when the application of certain 
types of fertiliser is prohibited and limitations of the 
application rates of fertilisers, taking into account the 
characteristics of the zones concerned, in particular 
soil conditions, soil type, slope, land use, and 
agricultural practices. Furthermore, Member States 
                                                           
2 An initial list of 40 CIAs linked to common policy types in 
agriculture, environment, and rural development has been 
compiled in the frame of the SEAMLESS project (Schleyer et al. 
2007, 35ff.). In this paper, only selected crucial institutional 
aspects will be introduced.  
3 Institutional indicators are here defined as variables that are used 
as input to the institutional assessment within PICA. About 100 
institutional indicators have been compiled so far in the frame of 
the SEAMLESS project (Schleyer et al., 2007, 38ff.). 
have to establish suitable monitoring and enforcement 
systems to ensure actors’ compliance with the rules. 
A. PICA Step 1: Classification of the Policy Option 
Using all available information on the concrete 
form and content of the policy option provided by the 
policy maker, this element of the EU Nitrate Directive 
– according to the matrix of policy types (Table 1) – is 
categorised as a regulatory type of policy having 
effects on markets. Effectively, only the national 
regulations determine the precise limits of restrictions 
in time and space. Furthermore, it is assumed that no 
compensations are paid covering the costs induced by 
these restrictions. These uncompensated restrictions 
have an impact on the production costs of farmers 
(e.g., yields may decrease, due to restrictions in 
fertiliser use) and, thus, on their market position.  
B. PICA Step 2: Crucial Institutional Aspects Related to the 
Policy Option 
According to the identification of the policy type in 
the previous step, in PICA Step 2, only those CIAs 
related to regulatory policy instruments intervening in 
markets have to be considered. Within the 
SEAMLESS project, an extensive literature review has 
been carried out to identify CIAs that are typically 
linked with respective policy types [18]. From this 
‘library of CIAs’ those CIAs are extracted that 
potentially hamper or foster the effective 
implementation of policies of the type ‘regulatory on 
market’. Now, relevant national and regional 
stakeholders and scientific experts are consulted, 
discussing the relevance of every identified CIA for 
the policy option under scrutiny. Here, some of the 
CIAs extracted from the library might be regarded as 
relevant for the policy type in general, but not be 
considered as being crucial for the specific policy 
option to be assessed and, thus, will be skipped at this 
stage. In turn, additional CIAs that have not yet been 
covered so far may be included in the assessment of 
the policy option under scrutiny. The following CIAs 
likely to constrain the implementation of the Directive 
are suggested for illustrative purposes:  
•  Strong bargaining power of farmers’ associations    5 
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The implementation of mandatory measures 
restricting the use of fertilisers in designated 
vulnerable zones affects directly the production costs 
of farmers in these zones, often leading to income 
losses. Yet, the degree of concrete restrictions is 
determined by the respective Member States or 
regions. It is assumed that a strong agricultural lobby 
might be able to soften these mandatory restrictions, or 
to obtain exception clauses. Thus, strong farmers’ 
associations might hamper the effective 
implementation of the Directive.  
•  Information asymmetry state vs. firm and high 
level of opportunism 
Information asymmetries between public 
administrations (state) and agricultural producers can 
be conceived as the result of monitoring problems, due 
to the inability (technical/knowledge/personnel) or 
even unwillingness of the administration in charge to 
monitor and, if applicable, sanction actors’ behaviour, 
but also due to the characteristics of the resources and 
the related activities to be monitored. Mandatory 
measures to reduce water pollution by nitrates are 
difficult or very costly to observe and to measure. 
Non-compliance cannot be associated clearly with 
single farmers since nitrates diffuse slowly into often 





















Furthermore, it is assumed that high levels of 
opportunism on part of the farmers concerned are 
likely to exacerbate the problem, leading to high costs 
for controlling necessary to deter actors from cheating. 
C. PICA Step 3: Linking Crucial Institutional Aspects to 
Institutional Indicators 
The result of PICA Step 2 is a restricted list of CIAs 
that is considered to be of particular importance for 
assessing the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of 
implementing the selected core element of the EU 
Nitrate Directive. Each CIA that is selected from the 
library of CIAs is linked with at least one institutional 
indicator from the available portfolio that can help to 
evaluate the respective CIA. For further processing, 
only those indicators are selected that are considered 
to have some explanatory power with respect to the 
policy option under scrutiny. At this stage, the 
availability, quality, and geographical scope of 
quantitative data, as well as the precise forms and 
scopes of suggested qualitative assessments, need to 
be discussed. For illustration, Table 2 contains 
examples of institutional indicators that might be used 
for assessing the extent of ‘Bargaining power of 
farmers’ associations’.  




Description/Data Data  Sources/
Databases 
Expert assumptions on 





Number of farmers that are member in a 







High percentages indicate a 





Number of farmers’ associations  National 
Statistical 
Databases 
High numbers indicate a 
relatively weak bargaining 







(Number of) farmers’ associations (of a 
country) with official representatives in 
Brussels 
Data assembled 
by expert group 
High numbers indicate a 
high influence on the 
political decision making 
process at EU level and 
strong bargaining power 
Structure of 
farming system 
Ratio = Number of farms / Number of 
people employed in the farming sector 
SEAMLESS 
Databases 
Low ratios indicate a 
farming system dominated 
by large farms and, thus, a 
high influence on the 
political decision making 




Monetary budget of producer support in a 
country 
OECD  High estimates indicate a 
strong bargaining power of 
farmers’ associations   6 
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D. PICA Step 4: Aggregating Information on the Selected 
CIAs  
In this final step of PICA, the information provided 
by the institutional indicators is used for a qualitative 
assessment of the restricted list of CIAs. This includes, 
first, combining the various indicator information 
available for every single CIA of the restricted list to 
arrive at a qualitative statement about the relative 
extent of this CIA in all countries and/or regions and, 
second, defining thematic categories of institutional 
compatibility to group the CIAs. Each thematic 
category draws on information from at least one CIA. 
For the selected core element of the EU Nitrate 
Directive the information is grouped according to the 
following two thematic categories: 
1)  Communication capacity 
•  Bargaining power of farmers’ associations 
2)  Governance structures compatibility 
•  Information asymmetry state vs. firm 


















Finally, these categorised region- or country-wise 
qualitative statements on the compatibility of the 
policy option are presented to the policy maker who 
has commissioned the policy assessment. Here, an 
interactive form of communication is preferred since 
this provides the opportunity to discuss the results and, 
perhaps, the introduction of complementary policy 
instruments in countries or regions where – according 
to the PICA results – implementation is likely to be 
substantially hampered. Figure 1 summarises the four 
steps of PICA. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The methodological and theoretical 
conceptualisation of PICA is innovative, because it 
takes the perspective of policy makers who intend to 
influence the behaviour of actors when designing and 
implementing new policies. Unlike, e.g., scientists, 
policy makers may in the first place not be interested 
in a detailed analysis of the institutional dynamics. 
Instead, they rather want to know if a potential policy 
is likely to change actors’ behaviour in such a way that 
















Use existing institutional indicators
or elaborate new proxies that indicate
the extent of the crucial institutional aspect 
Society







Step1: Identify policy type
(e.g., regulatory / market) -
Step 3: Select indicators
(e.g., Membership in farmers’
associations)
Number of people
employed in the farming sector
Number of farmers
that are member 
in a farmers’ association
Number of farms Producer Support
Estimate
Step 2: Extract crucial institutional aspects




Figure 1: Scheme of the Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment (source: own figure). 
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Consequently, PICA has been designed as an 
explorative tool that is able to identify main 
institutional incompatibilities that might act against 
policy implementation. Thus, PICA can be considered 
as an early warning system for institutional 
incompatibilities. However, PICA results point to 
(potential) institutional incompatibilities without 
providing detailed insights in the concrete (region and 
policy dependent) causalities that lead to these 
institutional compatibilities; thus, further empirical 
analysis would be necessary to design appropriate 
instruments to overcome or mitigate those 
incompatibilities. All in all, PICA may help to avoid 
irreversible investments for policy design and 
implementation, since policy makers get informed at 
an early stage whether the results they expect may not 
materialise. Furthermore, within the four steps PICA 
provides a flexible structure that can be adapted very 
easily to all possible agricultural, environmental, and 
rural policy options as well as institutional contexts. It 
allows for a low-cost and time-saving research and the 
results are easy to communicate to policy makers. 
PICA is still work in progress. Despite being an 
explorative tool, all PICA steps can build already on a 
solid basis derived from theoretical insights and 
empirical institutional analysis. Yet, neither the 
current library of CIAs as a whole, nor the lists of 
CIAs linked to a particular policy type can be seen as 
static, but need to be revised and complemented 
continually to improve the accuracy of the predictions. 
Furthermore, main avenues for improvement would 
include testing the ability of the typology of policy 
options to actually filter the CIAs properly.  
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